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Abstract
A vast recent literature has stressed social fragmentation’s negative impact on the provision of
public goods. This is a key issue, given that public goods availability has been reckoned as crucial to
economic development, while developing countries’ societies often exhibit high degrees of fragmen-
tation. Although it has been well established both empirically and theoretically that fragmentation
is detrimental to collective action, two caveats ought to be considered. First, a high level of social
fragmentation is often associated with greater inequality, which, as Olson pointed out, may be ben-
eficial to collective action. In Olson’s argument, should most of the public goods benefits accrue
to a small number of group members, they are encouraged to invest in group activities, given that
their stakes in the collective action are quite high. Second, should access to publicly provided goods
be restricted to the elite, a positive relationship may be found between fragmentation and ethnically
based patronage. Given that both patronage and inequality are common in developing countries, it
is surprising that fragmentation has never been found to have a positive effect on the provision of
public goods. This article aims at showing that not only does this positive relationship exist, but it is
linked to the presence of wealthy individuals who are in a position to deny access to public goods to
other groups members.
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1 Introduction
Public goods availability has become a central issue for economic development and is a key concern of
many developing societies. For instance, as Banerjee et al. (2007) recall "The National Election Survey
in India, carried out by the Center for the study of Developing Societies in 1996, asks 10,000 voters an
open-ended question: "What are the three main problems people like you face today?" Poverty was the
most popular response [...] but public goods came in a close second. Nearly a fifth of all respondents
listed problems associated with different types of public amenities as their main problem". The hitch
is that developing societies that sorely feel the absence of public goods are also often highly socially
fragmented.
It has been established for some time, both theoretically and empirically, that social fragmentation
undermines public goods provision by hampering collective action. This negative impact may come
in three ways. First heterogenous societies often exhibit strong differences in preferences regarding
public goods characteristics and therefore encounter difficulties in voicing their claims to limited public
resources. Second, individuals may be reluctant to work with other groups’ members. The impact of
group heterogeneity on group participation has been analyzed by Alesina and Ferrara (2000). The third
issue arises from the fact that different groups may disagree on the sharing of the private benefits or on
the allocation of their effort, due to potential free riding. Moreover, they fail to implement cooperation
enforcement devices across groups. Banerjee et al. (2007) provide a theoretical framework for this
issue and discuss how community characteristics such as the presence of an influential group, group
size, cohesion and the distribution of benefits influence free riding 1. According to their analysis, group
inequality has ambiguous effects and can increase or decrease collective effort depending on the shape
of the effort cost function. However, Bardhan et al. (2007) take a more clear-cut stand by showing that
in some situations, inequality between groups increases efficiency in solving collective action problems.
This echoes the positive role that Olson (1965) attributed to inequality in collective action. In Olson’s
argument, should most of the benefits accrue to a small number of group members, they may be willing
to bear the full cost of providing public goods. As inequality is often associated with social fragmen-
tation, this argument points toward a positive role played by fragmentation on the provision of public
1The presence of devices aiming at promoting group cooperation is not taken into account here. As Banerjee et al. (2007)
put it "some of these devices have been shown to be empirically important in mitigating free rider problems in public goods
settings and our main reason for staying clear of them here is that strong enough coordination mechanisms can make almost
any group outcome implementable. We believe a micro-founded theory of such coordination is required to make this approach
interesting and sharpen its predictive power, and we are not aware of any such theory".
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goods, through increased inequality and provided that public goods benefits are privatized. This point
has been made by Alesina and Ferrara (2005). As they rightly point out "while pure public goods may
be lower in more fragmented communities, the amount of publicly provided "private" goods - especially
those that can be targeted to specific groups- may be larger. We can then have a positive correlation
between fragmentation and ethnically based patronage". Patronage is common in developing countries.
For instance, in India, on which this paper focuses, caste patronage is well evidenced in economic life
(see for instance Srinivas (1955); Platteau (1995)) as well as in Indian politics (Chandra (2004)).
Empirically, fractionalization’s negative impact on the level of public goods has first been brought out
by Alesina et al. (1999). Focussing on US county, metro and city data, they found that more fragmented
cities spend proportionally less on schooling, roads, and trash pickups but more on health and police.
Interestingly, it may be argued that the last two goods are not independent from income in the United
States, thereby suggesting that public goods may benefit from fractionalization provided that individual
income comes in the equation.
As Banerjee and Somanathan (2001) point out, the authors use data for public goods that are contem-
poraneous to the fractionalization data, and given the high mobility environment of US cities, the analysis
may be flawed with reverse causality due to a sorting effect analyzed by Tiebout (1956). Following their
seminal work, other authors have tried to firmly establish the link between fractionalization and collec-
tive action or public goods. Miguel and Gugerty (2005) also found a negative relationship between ethnic
fractionalization and school funding and infrastructure in Kenya. One caveat to their work is that it may
not be immune from Tiebout’s sorting as well, although the authors use different specifications to address
this issue. Banerjee and Somanathan (2001) have tried to tackle the issue of reverse causality by using
caste fragmentation data from the 1931 census to explain the provision of public goods in the 1970s and
the 1980s, which makes sense given the low level of mobility in rural India. Regressing the proportion
of villages in districts having access to a particular good, they found fractionalization had a negative
impact on nearly half of the selected public goods, while it had a positive significant effect for 10% of
them. Interestingly, the authors admit that the fragmentation measure may be a proxy for inequality and
that the relatively rich can be effective in getting goods to their village. In a similar analysis, Banerjee
et al. (2005) found that caste fragmentation has a significant negative impact on 10 out of 26 public
goods and a positive significant impact on 3, thus providing more mixed results about the relationship.
Moreover, Somanathan et al. (2006) found that caste heterogeneity had no impact on collective action
regarding the preservation of a common forest in the Indian Himalayas. The detrimental role of social
fragmentation in the provision of public goods is not definite, as evidenced by this short literature review.
3
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Most of the empirical work has, so far, been conducted on a rather aggregate level and has primarily
been concerned with the level of public goods. Micro data may bring out a different story. Indeed,
little has been said on how these public resources and their usage are allocated across villages and even
less across households. As discussed earlier, if fragmentation is a proxy for the presence of wealthy
individuals who enjoy the political leverage to bring the needed goods to their villages, and who reap
sufficient benefits from them to disregard free riding costs, fragmentation may prove beneficial to the
provision of public goods. Informative micro analyses are those of Dayton-Johnson (2000), Bardhan
(2000) and Khwaja (2009)and Anderson (2007). Their results, however, should be handled with care due
to data scarcity. Looking at 48 irrigation systems and maintenance indicators in Mexico, Dayton-Johnson
(2000) found that social heterogeneity has both a direct negative effect by lowering cooperative effort and
a positive indirect one by making a group less likely to select the poorly performing allocation rule, so that
its indirect effect on cooperation is positive. Economic inequality is found to lower cooperative effort,
although its impact is U-shaped. Besides, economic inequality has an indirect effect on cooperation
via its effect on the choice of the distributive rule. Bardhan (2000) found similar results looking at 48
irrigation systems maintenance in South India villages. The social homogeneity variable is hardly found
significant, while inequality is found to have a significant U-shaped impact although it is twofold. On
the one hand, inequality’s direct effect is negative, while on the other hand, the indirect effect, working
through the cost sharing rule is positive. Another interesting point, is that better off farmers tend to violate
water allocations rules crafted by others and respect those defined by the elite. This suggests that the latter
holds public resources access in a strong grip. For instance, Anderson (2007) showed how higher castes
control the access to irrigation systems and are unwilling to sell water to lower castes. Khwaja (2009)
also found a U-shaped effect of land inequality on projects maintenance in rural communities in Pakistan,
although fragmentation’s negative coefficient remained significant.
Micro data analysis do not help drawing a clearer picture of fragmentation’s detrimental role to the
provision of public goods, although they stressed the close link that it has with inequality. They clearly
emphasize that high levels of inequality do raise the likelihood of successful collective action through
the definition of the allocation rule, which is often designed by better off individuals. One of the reasons
may be found in Olson’s argument, as discussed above. These analysis show how wealthy individuals
have sufficiently high stakes in public goods to bear a large part of their provision costs and how they
restrict their access to their peers.
This article aims at testing at a micro level the theoretical prediction according to which fragmenta-
4
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tion may have a positive impact on the provision of public goods as (a) it proxies high levels of inequality
and (b) in the event that the elite restrict their access to their own members. Such a result would have
strong implications in developing economies since universal access to public goods is key to develop-
ment. It would emphasize the fact that one should not only look at the presence of public goods but
also at the use that is made of them. The analysis is run using data collected in the Indian states of
Uttar Pradesh and Bihar aggregated at village, hamlet and household levels. Section 2 presents the data,
section 3 sets out the empirical strategy, while results are discussed in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
The analysis is based on data collected in 1997-1998 by the World Bank in a Survey of Living Conditions
in the Indian states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. The data cover 2,250 households spread across 342
neighborhoods or "tolas" in 120 villages in 25 districts. These two states form most of what has been
referred to as India’s poverty belt and caste relationships in this region are known to be confrontational,
to put it mildly. For instance, in 1998 more than one fourth of hate crimes committed against scheduled
castes in India were perpetrated in these 2 states alone2. In this section, we discuss the choice of the
variables that are used in the empirical analysis as well as basic data.
2.1 Communities
Indian society has long been divided along two lines: caste and religion. Caste has long been and remains
a rich field of investigation for anthropologists and sociologists, since it is a rare example of institution-
alized hierarchical social fragmentation that has been ruling Indian everyday life for more than 3,000
years. Stringent caste specific rules govern, not to say limit, groups interactions. Restrictions are particu-
larly strong in the field of marriage and commensality, but are not confined to these domains. Caste also
includes a hierarchical feature that assigns every individual its place in the social ladder and thus impacts
potential inter-group cooperation. Since the 1949 Indian constitution outlawed caste based discrimination
and untouchability, a reservation policy has been set up for lower castes, thereby increasing inter-castes
tensions as anti-reservation protests have shown. The number of castes, or "jatis" are estimated at 4,700,
although due to the reservation policy, the Census of India groups them into 4 broad categories: the
higher segment of society or forward castes (26% of the population), backward castes (52%), and outcasts
such as dalits, labeled scheduled castes ("SC" 16% of the population) and tribes labeled scheduled tribes
("ST" 7%). The two last categories represent the weaker segment of society. A similar classification is
2source: India Ministry of Home Affairs, National Crime Records Bureau
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used in our data where castes have been coded as "UP", "MID", backward agricultural caste ("BAC"),
other backward agricultural castes ("OBC"), and scheduled castes ("SC"). In our sample, these groups
account respectively for 15%, 3%, 30%, 22% and 31% of the Hindu population. It is worth noticing that
this classification probably underestimates actual fragmentation. Indeed, it encompasses very different
situations as Brahmins’ prestige may be very different from another less well regarded caste, although
both are labeled "forward caste".
While caste is clear-cut and a well established institution among Hindus, it is also a reality among
other religious groups, although not in the same plain way. Muslims and Christians seem to have inher-
ited from their Hindu ancestors’ castes. In our sample, muslims are classified into upper castes (37.4%
of the muslim population) and lower castes (62.6%). Two features of the caste system are of particular
interest to our study, since they help at brushing aside the reverse causality issue associated with the
fractionalization measure:
∙ caste membership is determined by birth and individual upward social mobility is ruled out
∙ social mobility of a caste as a group is fairly limited and may only occur over generations
Another social fragmentation factor is religion. India is reputed for its baffling religious diversity. Hindus
represents 80.5% of the population. Muslims come as the second largest community with 138M members
(13.4%) followed by Christians (2.3%) and Sikhs (1.9%). In the states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar on which
our analysis focuses, Hindus account for respectively 80.6% and 83.2% of the population while the rest of
the population is muslim. In our sample, 90% of the households are Hindus and 10% muslims. Religion
is an important factor of social division in India and is becoming increasingly so, as the riots that took
place in the state of Gujarat in 2002 and its thousands of deaths have testified.
Caste and religious heterogeneity is measured by the now popular fractionalization index,
퐹푟푎푐 = 1−
푛∑
1
휋푖
2
where 휋푖 is the population share of the 푖푡ℎ caste. Please note that caste encompasses all the Hindus castes
as well as Muslims’. In doing so we have assumed that the gap between two Hindus castes is as large
as between an Hindu and a Muslim caste. This hypothesis may be discussed, although in the absence of
additional information it seems sensible. Our fractionalization index ranges in villages from 0 to 0.78
with a mean of 0.53 and standard deviation of 0.17. In tolas, it ranges from 0 to 0.8 with a mean of 0.48
and a standard deviation of 0.25. This suggests that both villages and tolas are rather fragmented. As a
comparison, the index value reported by Alesina et al. (1999) in the US ranges from 0.02 to 0.61 with a
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mean of 0.26 and a standard deviation of 0.14.3
2.2 Selected Public Goods
Social fragmentation impacts the level of public goods provision since it hinders collective action. How-
ever, the canal through which the lack of collective action negatively impacts access to public goods has
never been made quite clear. On the one hand, the absence of collective action prevents from making
a clear case for goods provision to authorities via the political route. On the other hand, it also hinders
populations from pooling resources to have the goods built by communities. One of the reasons why the
route has never been designed very explicitly is that researchers have tended to test all kinds of goods
without clearly distinguishing between those that require a political decision and hence a clear petition
from all communities and those that can be produced locally. For instance, in India, a village wishing
to connect to the electrical network need to voice their demand at the district level and require approval
from officials. On the other hand, paving a road to gain access to a village is of municipal competence.
Goods to be tested in our analysis belong to the two categories. We have tested for the presence of
primary and middle schools as well as that of electricity, phone connection and of an anganwadi center
(i.e. child development center). We have also included facilities that may be produced locally such as
the presence of a waste disposal system which in our case takes the form of an open drain, as well as the
presence of paved roads leading to the village and of a bus station. Should the impact of fractionalization
differ in these two categories we may be able to draw conclusions on the canal through which a lack of
collective action generates a lower level of public goods.
The government autonomy in implementing public goods should not be overlooked. This is what
Banerjee et al. (2007) called the top down approach. For instance, the Indian state has made an important
commitment to public goods provision. As Banerjee et al. (2007) remind "in 1968, the ruling Congress
Party brought out the National Policy on Education, which made a commitment to universal primary
education. The Minimum Needs Program of 1974-75 set down explicit norms about access to public
goods in rural areas [...] Indira Gandhi made the removal of poverty (Garibi Hatao) the cornerstone of
her successful election campaign in 1971". Since these campaigns had been on for more than 20 years up
to 1997-98 when the data were collected, governments had time to make those goods available across the
country, irrespective of village characteristics. This may be especially true of education, as the spread
of educational facilities has long been a priority of many governments. Indeed in our sample, 94 out
3The index based on the 1971 census of India reported by Banerjee and Somanathan (2007) at a district level ranges from
0.2 to nearly 1 and has a mean of 0.9.
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of the 120 villages had primary public schools. In villages without a public primary school, more than
half households have access to it within less than 1km. However, as discussed earlier the production
of some other public goods relies much more heavily on local initiative, especially so since the 1992
act that empowered local governments. To sum up, public goods may be classified along two lines: (a)
those whose production brings third parties into play versus those whose production rests solely on local
initiative and (b) those that have long been the target of poverty removal programs.
2.3 Wealth inequality
Two main reasons may explain why wealth inequality may have an impact on public goods’ provision.
First, wealthy individuals tend to have enough political leverage to bring public goods to their village.
Second, they may be the ones benefiting most from public goods and therefore they may be willing to
undertake the cost of being free ridden. This is the Olson effect. For instance Foster and Rosenzweig
(1995) have found that the wealthier farmers are sooner ready to adopt high yielding varieties and thus
create a knowledge about this new agricultural technology. The other farmers have freely benefited from
this knowledge and have started adopting these varieties as well. Khwaja (2009) found a U-shaped rela-
tionship between wealth inequality and the maintenance of public goods by examining village level data
in Pakistan. According to his findings, a small increase in inequality leads to lower levels of maintenance
while stark inequality is often associated with better maintenance.
Wealth concentration is quite significant in our sample. The 20% richest own on average 57% of
the village total land value with a standard deviation of 0.13. This concentration varies greatly from one
village to another. In villages where land is most equally distributed land value ranges from 400,000Rs to
900,000Rs, while in villages exhibiting the most unequal distribution, it ranges from 5,800Rs to 14MRs.
A Gini coefficient has been calculated at village level. It ranges from 0.13 to 0.88 with a mean of 0.52
and a standard deviation of 0.12.
Drawing on Olson’s argument, we are in a position to say that fractionalization may have a positive
impact on the provision of public goods as fractionalization is often associated to greater inequality
and hence on the presence of wealthy individuals who are willing to undertake the cost of bringing a
public good to their village. Public good privatization may be another explanation for the positive role
of inequality and fractionalization. If the wealthy are able to restrict public goods usage, the free riding
problem associated to collective action will fade away. This is the argument we propose to examine in
our empirical strategy.
8
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3 Empirical Strategy
Our analysis comes in three steps. First, we want to establish the relationship between the fractionaliza-
tion index and the presence of public goods such as schools, electricity, telephone, etc. A logistic model
is used for each public good and is detailed in the next paragraph. Secondly, we want to investigate
whether this relationship is linked to the impact of wealth inequality on the provision of public goods
and we do so by replacing the fractionalization index by two different measures of inequality that are
discussed later in this section. These estimations are referred to as the fractionalization model. Finally, in
order to establish that the positive relationship is due to the systematic exclusion of certain groups from
public goods usage, we use a logistic model at the household level to assess its probability of accessing
a specific public good given a set of characteristics, including the group to which it belongs. The prob-
ability is then decomposed using the Oaxaca-Blinder method. Further details on this last estimation are
provided in the next subsection.
3.1 Specifications of the fractionalization model
The model is a logistic regression and is specified in a rather standard form. The likelihood of village or
tola 푖 to have the public good 푗 is:
푃푟(푌푖,푗 = 1) = 퐹 (훼퐹푟푎푐푖 + 훽휋푖 + 훾휎푖) (1)
where 퐹 is the logistic c.d.f. 휋푖 is a set of village/tola population characteristics such as average income,
the number and average size of households and the percentage of households whose primary source of
living is their own farm. The first three population characteristics are expected to have a positive im-
pact as public goods providers, such as utilities companies for instance, are more willing to service an
area packed with potential solvent users. However, one may argue that larger groups encounter greater
difficulties in coordinating collective action. Our intuition is that the positive population size effect will
outweigh a potential negative one, as the impact of group size on collective action has not been evidenced
or made plain and clear. We have also included a variable that represents the percentage of households
whose primary source of livelihood is their own farm, to proxy the village urbanization level. We expect
this variable to have a negative impact on the provision of public goods. Finally, 휎푖 represents the num-
ber of third parties interventions such as government or NGO programs in the village. Please note that
this variable is only available at village level and not at tola level. This variable is included in order to
account for the institutions’ autonomy in deciding to provide public goods as discussed in the selected
public goods section. Please note that neither the number of programs nor the average or total money al-
located are significantly correlated to fractionalization. In order to make the interpretation easier the list
9
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of the variables used is provided in appendix as well as the variables’ summary statistics and correlation
matrices.
Our aim is to determine whether fractionalization has an impact on public goods provision as it
proxies wealth inequality. Therefore, we include in equation (1) a Gini coefficient of land value. Drawing
on Khwaja (2009) experience, we also include the square of the Gini Coefficient to account for a potential
non linear effect of inequality. In a second step, we wish to establish that inequality plays a significant
role as it increases the chance of having very wealthy individuals who can exert political influence. Gini
may not be the appropriate indicator since it measures inequality of the entire distribution, whereas we
are more concerned with the upper hand of the distribution. The presence of such wealthy individuals is
represented by an indicator labeled wealth constructed as follows:
푤푒푎푙푡ℎ =
푊¯푖,10
푊¯푖
where 푊¯푖,10 is the average land value owned by the top percentile in village or tola 푖 and 푊¯푖 is the
average land value owned in village or tola 푖. This variable is then entered in (1) instead of and together
with the fractionalization index.
3.2 Specifications of the discrimination model
We now turn to the impact of belonging to a specific group on the access to three public goods: electricity,
school attendance and the availability of toilet systems. First, we turn to estimating the probability that
household 푖 has access to public good 푗 in the following manner
푃푟(푌푖,푗 = 1) = 퐹 (푋푖,푘훽ˆ푘) (2)
where 퐹 is the c.d.f. and 푋푖,푘 represent a vector of observations, for household 푖 on 푘 variables such as
caste, income, value of the land owned, literacy of the household head, and size of the household. 훽ˆ푘 is
the associated vector of coefficient estimates. Should caste have a significant impact on the probability
of having access to the public good, we may, so far, not be in a position to tell whether this impact is due
to discrimination or differences in characteristics among castes. In order to do so we follow the Oaxaca
(1973) and Blinder (1973) method of decomposing group differences extended to logistic models by inter
alia Nielsen (1998) and Fairlie (2006). Let’s assume that there are 푁 households (indexed 푖 = 1...푁 )
that belong to 푐 castes, each caste containing 푁푐 households. The likelihood for household 푖 belonging
to caste 푐 to have access to good 푗 (provided this good is available in the village) is
푃푟(푌푖,푗 = 1) = 퐹 (푋
푐
푖 훽ˆ
푐
푗 ) (3)
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where 푋푐푖 = 푋
푐
푖푘, 푘 = 1...퐾 represents the vector of observations, for household 푖 of caste 푐 on 퐾
variables which determine the likelihood of it having access to the public good and 훽ˆ푐푗 = 훽ˆ
푐
푗푘, 푘 = 1...퐾
is the associated vector of coefficient estimates for that caste. In order to make the presentation less
cumbersome, we will not compare all the caste groups against each other. We will, in a first step, run
the decomposition analysis by focusing on two groups: the untouchables (푠푐푠푡) which is the weakest
group and other castes (표푡ℎ푒푟푠). Therefore, 푐 = 푠푐푠푡, 표푡ℎ푒푟푠. The average probability of group 푐 having
access to good 푗 can then be written:
푃
푐
푗 = 푃 (푋
푐
푖 훽ˆ
푐
푗 ) = 푁
−1
푐
푁푐∑
푖=1
퐹 (푋푐푖 훽ˆ
푐
푗 ) (4)
Let’s now write the average probability for a 푠푐푠푡 household to have access to public good 푗 if it was
treated as a non scst-household:
푃
∗
푗 = 푁
−1
푠푐푠푡
푁푠푐푠푡∑
푖=1
퐹 (푋푠푐푠푡푖
ˆ훽표푡ℎ푒푟푠푗 ) (5)
The difference in average probabilities for a 푠푐푠푡 and an 표푡ℎ푒푟 household can then be written
푃
표푡ℎ푒푟푠
푗 − 푃 푠푐푠푡푗 = 푃 표푡ℎ푒푟푠푗 − 푃 ∗푗 + 푃 ∗푗 − 푃 푠푐푠푡푗 (6)
The second substraction on the right hand side of the equation may be referred to as the discrimination
effect, while the first substraction is the part of the difference in average probabilities that can be ascribed
to differences in characteristics.
3.3 Identification issues
3.3.1 Reverse causality
Many empirical works on the impact of fractionalization on the provision of public goods have been
disturbed by a reverse causality issue evidenced by Tiebout (1956). First, let’s recall that one of the
premises for the negative impact of fractionalization on collective action is preferences’ heterogeneity.
According to Tiebout’s model, individuals sort themselves to neighborhoods that provide them with the
mostly desired public goods thereby homogenizing the neighborhoods. For instance, the poor may con-
verge to areas that provide services valued by the poor. Together with Miguel and Gugerty (2005) and
Banerjee and Somanathan (2007) we believe that this issue is not so manifest in developing countries.
Indeed, Tiebout’s model rests on the assumptions of perfect mobility and information, which are seldom
found in developing countries. Unfortunately our data do not provide direct information on migrations.
However, as Rosenzweig and Stark (1987) have shown, migrations in India are dominated by women for
11
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the purpose of marriage and their mobility helps in mitigating households’ income risks and in smoothing
consumption. The 2001 Census of India indicates that in the states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, 81% and
89% of migrants are women out of which 82% and 87% migrate for marriage purposes, thereby confirm-
ing that Tiebout’s sorting may not play a significant role, at least in this part of India. Besides, as noted
earlier, caste membership comes by birth and individual mobility is rules out while collective mobility
may only occur over generations.
3.3.2 Substitution
Banerjee and Somanathan (2001) and Banerjee and Somanathan (2007) brought out the issue of substi-
tution across public goods. "Neglected populations may not get less of every public good - they may
simply be given less valuable goods. Villages without access to a hospital may receive some type of
less elaborated health facility for reasons of equity or as part of a political mechanism aimed at pacifying
them". Two reasons lead to believe that substitution is not much of an issue in the analysis: (a) we use the
presence of a particular public good in villages and tolas rather than budget shares and (b) selected public
goods do not provide the same kind of services. It would make little sense to assume which public good
is superior to the other, or if electricity should be preferred to schools. Banerjee and Somanathan (2001)
have tried to address this issue by exploiting the fact that scheduled tribes are weak political groups and
as such are unlikely to get the much coveted goods. Therefore, the goods for which the scheduled tribe
coefficient is significantly negative may be assumed to be the less coveted goods. Unfortunately, we are
not able to resort to this method as scheduled tribes are absent from the sample and scheduled castes
can not play this role as they are increasingly becoming politically strong. Moreover, it should be noted
that substitution would be an issue, should the fragmentation coefficient change sign from one good to
another. As it will be seen in the results section, this is not the case.
3.3.3 Omitted variables
It is very likely that different groups will want different goods. Brahmins for example may be very keen
on having schools due to their traditional role as knowledge depositories, while traders will be more
attached to roads. In this case, the heterogeneity measure would pick up the changes in the population’s
shares of the different groups. To control for this effect, we include the share of scheduled castes in
equation (1) as a robustness check, although we are forced to recognize that this is quite a rough measure.
Possible other omitted variables include topography measures, for it is much harder to build paved roads
in a mountainous environment. Unfortunately, such data are unavailable and the number of village
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points (120) prevents us from including district fixed effects 4. However, urbanization is proxied by the
percentage of households whose primary source of income is their own farm.
4 Results
Before delving into the results, we have to reckon that results at the tola level are much more informative
than at the village level for two reasons. First, the number of village data points (117) may reduce vari-
ations, whereas 320 tola points do not. Second, the decision to give a village access to a particular good
may have long come under district authorities and it is difficult to rule out their autonomy in making such
decisions. However, choice of school location within the village or the decision to connect a neighbor-
hood to the village electricity network relies much more on local initiative. Since, we are concerned with
the determinants of collective action, local initiative is of greater interest since they are less disturbed by
other parties’ decisions.
Results from estimating equation (1) are presented in table 1-A at the village level and table 2-A
at the tola level. Fractionalization’s coefficients are all positive both at the village and tola levels, even
though they are not significant for electricity, schools and bus stations at the village level. Whenever frac-
tionalization’s coefficients are not significant at the village level, coefficients attributed to the variable
indicating the number of NGOs’ or government sponsored programs are positive and significant, thereby
suggesting that social fragmentation has no impact due to the fact that both electricity and schools are
targeted goods of poverty removal programs. Organizations implementing those programs seem au-
tonomous in making their decisions. Besides, these programs seem efficient in implementing public
goods. On the other hand, whenever fragmentation is found to have a significant effect, so are the coef-
ficients for the number of government programs implemented, although they come in both positive and
negative. Reasons for the sign change are not clear. Still, it seems that high levels of fractionalization
are positively associated with a larger number of government programs 5. Lastly, population density
indicators and average income have neither a significant nor a large impact on the presence of public
4However, as a robustness check we have included a state dummy in the estimation of equation (1) both at the village and
tola levels and district fixed effects at the tola level. Such inclusions did modify neither the significance nor the sign or the size
of the coefficients but did significantly reduce the size of the sample. Results are available upon request.
5Regressing the number of government programs by the fractionalization index, the percentage of households whose primary
source of living is their own farm and the percentage of households whose head is illiterate, yields a positive and significant,
though at a 10 percent level, relationship between fractionalization and the number of completed government programs. Unfor-
tunately we do not have the necessary data to run a finer analysis of the relationship. Indisputably, political data and analysis
would be required
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goods. The variable representing the percentage of the population whose primary source of income is
their own farm is significantly detrimental to the availability of roads, phone connections, bus stations
and electricity. This accounts for the fact that the variable may be proxying low levels of urbanization of
the villages that increases the cost of connecting them.
Turning to results at tola level, two points should be made. First, fractionalization coefficients are
once again positive and often significant. Second, social heterogeneity is significantly beneficial to the
presence of electricity and middle schools, while it was not at the village level. As discussed earlier in
this section, while electrifying a village may be third parties autonomous decision, connecting or imple-
menting a school in a specific neighborhood depends on local initiative. The point is that third parties
interventions is important and may blur the results, stressing the importance of choosing the appropriate
level of aggregation. As later results will suggest, social heterogeneity positive impact is indeed related
to the positive role of wealth inequality in bringing electricity or implementing a middle school to the
tola and to restricted access to them. On the contrary, as later results will bring to light, access to primary
school is not restricted on the ground of caste membership. Universal access that follows many years of
education programs, may explain why fractionalization is never found to have an impact on the presence
of primary schools. Please note that including the percentage of scheduled castes does not change the
results, as set out in tables 1-B and 2-B, and the variable is almost never significant, disproving that
scheduled castes favor specific goods.
Tables 1-C and 2-C present the results when Gini coefficients are entered into equation (1) both alone
and in its quadratic form at the village and tola level respectively. At the tola level, fractionalization’s
coefficients are far from being significant across goods when entered with Gini indicators, while the
latter have significant or almost significant positive effects on the presence of all goods but electricity.
This suggests that fractionalization’s positive effect was indeed a proxy for inequality’s beneficial role.
Interestingly, fractionalization had no significant impact on the presence of anganwadi centers and public
primary schools, while inequality does have a positive one. Please recall our basic argument: fraction-
alization may have a positive impact on the presence of public goods since it proxies the presence of
wealthy individuals who are large contributors to their provision and as such, tend to restrict their ac-
cess to their peers. In the event of universal access, the wealthier may still be larger consumers of these
goods, which explains the positive relationship between inequality and social fragmentation, while the
others still benefit from them, which explains the absence of relationship between fractionalization and
the presence of the goods. This seems to be the case of public primary schools. Moreover, it should be
noted that inequality’s U-shaped impact has not been found in the results.
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At the village level, including Gini indicators did not make the significance of fractionalization’s
coefficients totally disappear. Consistent with results from table 1-A, fractionalization is far from being
significant for schools and bus stations. However, they come close to significance for both electricity
and paved road. On the other hand, Gini indicators are almost never found significant when entered with
fractionalization, whereas they are in most goods when entered alone. This points towards the idea that
fractionalization is not a proxy for wealth inequality, although the picture at the village level is quite
blurred. Looking at the tola level results brings out a more plain scenario. The difference in the clarity of
the results between the village and tola levels emphasizes once again the importance of looking at micro
data and choosing the appropriate level of aggregation.
As discussed earlier, Gini indicators may not be the most appropriate tools for solving the problem
at hand, since they encompass the whole distribution when we are more concerned with inequality at
the top hand of the distribution. For this reason, Gini is replaced by the 푤푒푎푙푡ℎ indicator. Results are
presented in tables 1-D and 2-D. Similar patterns seem to emerge. At the village level, fractionalization’s
coefficients are significant or close to significance when wealth indicators are not and vice versa. Similar
conclusions may be drawn from the results at the tola level. One of the issues we may be facing is that
of multicollinearity, since the correlation coefficient between fractionalization and wealth is 0.48 and
significant. In this case, the estimates from equation (1) when both 푤푒푎푙푡ℎ and fractionalization are en-
tered are difficult to interpret. This correlation is not so surprising given that patterns of land distribution
closely mimic social hierarchy. Hence the more fragmented the village, the more likely is the presence
of upper castes who own land whose value is much larger than the average. Please note that this problem
was less acute with Gini coefficients, since their correlation coefficient is 0.35 and significant.
To sum up, explaining fractionalization’s positive impact on the presence of public goods by inequal-
ity seems sensible but not definite, although data provide some support. Fragmentation’s positive effect
remains puzzling especially as it goes against previous empirical results. Going back to the theory, frac-
tionalization’s impact has been proved positive due to the presence of wealthy individuals who restrict
their access to their own groups members. We now turn to testing whether one group, in this particular
case the scheduled castes, is being denied access to electricity, waste disposal and education by esti-
mating equation (2). Results are presented in table 5. Controlling for different characteristics, being a
scheduled caste significantly reduces the likelihood of having access to electricity from 0.16 to 0.07, of
having lavatories from 0.11 to 0.03 and sending children to middle schools from 0.42 to 0.24. Please
recall that fractionalization had a significant positive impact on the presence of electricity, waste disposal
system and middle schools either at village or tola level. However, this was not the case regarding the
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availability of primary schools and indeed, results from table 5 show that access is not significantly re-
stricted. As pointed out earlier, the availability of primary education has been a goal of many NGOs or
publicly sponsored programs and they seem to have been quite successful since the average probability
of sending a child to primary school for the total sample is 0.67 and does depend neither on income,
nor on group membership. Average probabilities to have access to these goods for scheduled castes and
other groups are detailed in the table below (estimation of equation (4)):
Electricity Toilets Middle school
Total sample 0,157 0,112 0,422
Other groups 0,200 0,153 0,516
Scheduled caste 0,065 0,028 0,237
Difference 0,136 0,124 0,279
However, the difference in average probabilities may well be coming from systematic differences in
characteristics between the two groups. For instance, a household whose head is illiterate is significantly
less likely to get access to the public goods. There may be a greater share of illiterate heads among
scheduled castes. To distinguish between the part of the difference in average probabilities that can be
ascribed to discrimination and systematic difference in characteristics, a Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition
has been performed, as discussed in section 3. The table below presents the results.
Electricity Toilets Middle school
Difference 0,136 0,124 0,279
ascribed to discrimination 0,082 0,064 0,182
ascribed to group 0,054 0,060 0,097
difference in characteristics
It is striking to see that more than half of the difference in average probabilities may be attributed to
discrimination. Scheduled castes are being denied access to these public -or should we say from now
on "collective"- goods on the sole basis of their caste membership. This echoes the results found by
Anderson (2007). The author explained the difference in income between upper castes and lower castes
by the latter’s restricted access to irrigation systems and dysfunctional private water markets.
5 Conclusion
Social fractionalization has been found to have a positive effect on the provision of public goods at
the micro level, while most of the previous empirical research attributed a negative effect looking at
aggregated data. This positive effect seems to proxy the positive role played by high levels of inequality
although most of its effect can be explained by the exclusion of less favored groups from public goods
16
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access. The results emphasize the need to both look at local conditions and the use which is made of
public goods instead of focusing only at their provision level. Since universal access to public goods is
the cornerstone of many development programs, policy makers should also remain vigilant that publicly
provided goods do not become "privatized". Conditions preventing such a situation may be the object of
future research.
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LIST OF VARIABLES AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
Variable name Description Nb obs Mean S.D.
Village level fracvil Fractionalization index calculated 118 0,52 0,17
at the village level.
avgincvil Average households’ yearly income. 120 10 021,62 6 621,33
nbhhldvil Number of households in the village. 118 232,20 140,64
avgsizehhvil Average number of individuals within households. 120 6,29 1,18
nbspspgm Number of sponsored programs in 120 1,28 0,73
the last 12 months in the village.
nbgvtpgmcomp Number of completed government 120 0,63 1,01
programs in the village in the last 12 months.
pctownfarm Percentage of village households 120 0,45 0,19
whose primary source of living is
their own farm.
pcthdilitvil Percentage of village households 120 0,51 0,17
whose head is illiterate.
pctvilscst Percentage of village households 118 0,28 0,21
that belong to scheduled castes.
Ginilandvil Gini coefficient at the village level based 120 0,52 0,12
on households land value in Rupees.
Ginilandvilsq Square of the above Gini coefficient. 120 0,29 0,13
wealthvil Wealth indicator as per section 3.1. 120 3,21 1,03
Tola level fractola Fractionalization index. 342 0,32 0,28
avginctola Average households’ yearly income. 326 9 961,05 10 733,48
nbhhldtola Number of households in the tola. 342 6,59 6,07
avgsizehhtola Average number of individiuals within 342 6,24 1,92
tola households.
pctownfarmtola Percentage of tola households 342 0,46 0,32
whose primary source of living is
their own farm.
pcthdilittola Percentage of tola households 342 0,52 0,31
whose head is illiterate.
pcttolascst Percentage of tola households 342 0,25 0,33
that belong to scheduled castes.
Ginilandtola Gini coefficient at the tola level 256 0,40 0,17
based on households’ land value in Rs.
Ginilandtolasq Square of the above Gini coefficient. 256 0,19 0,13
wealthtola Wealth indicator as per section 3.1. 316 2,12 1,01
Household level hdilit Dummy = 1 if household’s head is illiterate. 2 254 0,51 0,50
income Household’s yearly income. 1 834 9 933,73 16 449,72
ownfarm Dummy = 1 if household’s primary 2 238 0,46 0,50
source of living is its own farm.
hhsize Number of individuals within 2 254 6,29 3,19
the household.
hdage Age of the household’s head. 2 254 0,28 0,45
scsthh Dummy = 1 if the household belongs
to a scheduled caste. 2 254 46,73 14,16
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TABLE 5 : DEPENDENT VARIABLE: PUBLIC GOOD 푗 ACCESSED BY HOUSEHOLD 푖
Odds ratios
Electricity Toilets School Primary school Middle school
head illiterate 0.326*** 0.295*** 0.276*** 0.802 0.423***
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.545) (0.007)
income 1.000 1.000** 1.000 1.000 1.000
(0.149) (0.016) (0.809) (0.924) (0.252)
ownfarm 0.955 1.384** 0.895 1.116
(0.816) (0.036) (0.770) (0.723)
hhld size 1.052* 1.036 1.201*** 1.083 1.125**
(0.078) (0.517) (0.000) (0.110) (0.039)
hhld head age 1.023*** 1.035** 1.008 0.968*** 1.044***
(0.001) (0.013) (0.150) (0.010) (0.001)
hhld sch. caste 0.405*** 0.277** 0.817 1.329 0.464**
(0.001) (0.022) (0.171) (0.513) (0.022)
Observations 961 429 1181 690 227
Log Likeiood -374.503 -124.164 -633.744 -137.834 -136.679
Wald Chi2 78.430 32.554 119.319 10.283 28.284
Pseudo R squared 0.104 0.174 0.118 0.025 0.131
Robust p values in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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